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This paper considers the situation in which a single indivisible object has to
be allocated to one person out o( a group whose members all have equal rights to
it. I)il(erent persous valur the object díf(emntly and each person only knowe his
own value exactly. The question is who should get the object and by how much
this person should compensate the others in order to guarantee a fair and efficient
allocation. After having shown that several well-known methods perform unsatis-
factory, we derive an impossibility theorem showing that some classical fair division
methods cannot be implemented when there is incomplete information. Finally,
we give examples of inechanisms that do guarantee fair and efficient outcomes.2
1 Introduction
The problem of how to divide an indivisible object among a group of persons who all
have equal rights to it arises, for example, in divorce settlements and in inheritance situ-
ations in which there are equivalent heirs but there is no will. In a business setting, the
problem arises in the dissolving of joint ventures. In this paperl we will assume that side
payments between the parties are possible and we will try to answer the queation of who
should get the object and by how much each of the other players should be compensated
in order to obtain (ex post) a fair and efficient allocation. Efficiency implies that the
object should be allocated to the person who values is most. The fairness criterion we
will employ is the one proposed in Foley (1967): It is required that the final allocation be
envy free, i.e. no player should envy another, each player should prefer what he himself
receives above what any other player receives.
There exists an extensive literature on the fair division problem~. In this literature
various concepts of fairncws havc bcrn proposcd and scvcral fair division methods, such
as divide and choose, random allocation followed by bargaining, and suctioning the ob-
ject followed by an equal division of the revenue, have been analyzed. In most of the
literature, attention has been restricted to the case of complete information3. Frequently,
however, it will be the case that each player, although he may know exactly how much
he himself values the object, has only somewhat vague (probabilistic) information about
his opponents' values. This opens up the possibility for strategic manipulation: A person
might pretend that he values the object more (or less) than he actually does in order to
obtain a more favorable outcome. Our aim in this paper is to atudy the consequences of
such strategic behavior in fair division situations. Specifically we will investigate whether
iMoet of the material in this paper ia taken from the unpubliahed working paper Van Damme (1985).
~For example Crawford (1977), Crawford and Heller (1979), Kuhn (1967), Luce and Raiffa (1957,
Chapter 14), Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), Samueleon (1980), Steinhaus (1948) and Varian (1974).
3Exceptions are Gutó (1986), Guth and Van Damme (1986) and Lyon (1986). In aome older papere
it ia merely pointed out that the propoeed methode are vulnerable to atrategic manipulation, there ia no
analyeie of ita consequencea Dubina (1977) has ahown that minmax atrategiea imply truthful revelation
of valueein the Steinhaus procedure.3
it is possible to obtain fair and efficient outcomea when players use their private infor-
mation strategically.
Recently, considerable attention has been devoted to the atudy of bargaining under
asymmetric information'. In this context the conaequencea of etrategic behavior have
been thoroughly investigated, and it has been shown that strategic behavior may pre-
vent an ex post efficient outcome being reached. Although the insighta generated by the
bargaining literature are highly relevant for the problem at hand (indeed we will make
extensive use of them), there are at least two novel aspects in the fair division problem.
1~'irst of all we will scY~ that division methoda that treat Lhe players asyrnmetrically ag-
gravate the incentive problems. Methoda that preserve the symmetry of the playere are
superior, they yield higher payoffs. As a consequence it is not desirable to reduce the
division problem to a bargaining problem by first allocating the property rights. Sec-
ondly, in the bargaining literature, attention has been restricted to the efficiency aspect,
yucstions of fairness Lavc not birn considcrcd.
It should be noted that in the more abstract (cooperative) papers on gamea with in-
complete information by Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and Myerson (1979, 1984) some of
the axioms are based on equity considerations. However, these papers make the funda-
mental assumption that all that matters are the expected utilities at the interim stage,
i.e. at the point in time where each player knows his own value but dces not yet know
those of his opponents. In contrast, in the present study our interest is also in the point
in time where all values have been revealed as we want to guarantee that ex post there
is no envy. Hence, the crucial parameters for our study are the actual, ex post, utilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After having introduced some
basic concepts in Section 2, we atudy, for the special case in which there are only two
participants, some well-known division methods in Section 3. It is shown that methods
that keep players in symmetric positions (such as auctions) outperíorm asymmetric di-
~See Kennan and Wilson (1990) for a recent survey.4
vision methods (such as divide and choose), but that also suctions may yield outcomes
that are not envy free. In Section 4 we show that all ex poet efficient mechanisma are
equivalent at the interim stage (i.e. they generate the same expected utilities) and that
random allocation is the worst possible mechanism. Section 5 ahowa that several `classi-
cal' fair division methoda cannot be implemented when there is incomplete information,
and Section 6 gives an example of a mechanism that always generatea fair and efficient
outcomes. Section 7 investigates whether poaitive reaulta can also be obtained if one
requires that equilibria be in dominant strategies and Section 8 offers a brief conclusion.
2 The Division Problem
We consider a situation in which a single indivisible object has to be allocated to one
person from a group of n. All players have equal rights to the object, side paymenta
are possible, and each player is risk neutral and has a utility function that is additively
separable in money and the object. Hence, if player i's value of the object is v; and if t;
is the monetary transfer that this player pays, then his utility is u; - v; - t; if he geta
the object while his utility is u; --t; if he doesn't get it. Each player's valuation is
known privately, but it is common knowledge that all values are drawns independently
from a distribution F with support (y, v]. We assume that the density f is positive and
continuous and without loss of generality we take p- 0 and v- 1. Hence, each player
indeed values the object.
The problem is to determine which player should geL the object and by how much 6e
should compensate his partners so aa Lo guarantee that the final allocation ia both fair
and efficient. A mechanism is a game form specifying the allocation rulea. Formally, a
mechanism is a tuple p -G A, p, t~, where
A- A~ x... x A„ with A; being the (nonempty) set of pure atrategies of player i,
bllence, we follow the seminal idea from Harsanyi (1967-8) to convert a situation with incomplete in-
formation to one with asymmetric information. The aeeumption of independence simplifiee the problem,
we haven't analyzed the caee where values are correlated.5
p-(p~,...,p„) with p; : A~ [0,1] and ~;p;(a) - 1 for all a E A. (p;(a) is the
probability that i receives the object if a is chosen), and (2.2)
t-(t;~);,~ with t;~ : A--~ R and ~~ t;i(a) - 0 for all i and all a E A. (t;~(a) is the
monetary transfer that j has to pay (to a mediator) in case a E A ia chosen and
the object is allocated to i). (2.3)
Note that in (2.2) we require that the object be allocated under all circumstances and
that in (2.3) iL is required Lhat the players' books always balanco. In Section ? the latter
constraint is relaxed by allowing the mediator to act as a clearing house whose booka
have to balance only on average rather than for each value combination.
Given the mechanism {~, a(pure) strategy for player i is a map a; : [0, 1] -~ A;,
and a strategy combination v is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each player. We now
introduce some additional notation. For a value vector v we write vh for the highest
value and v' for the second highest value. We write a -(a-;, a;), v- (v-;, v;), o-
(v-;,o;) and a`a; -(a-;,a;). Furthermore, v(v) -(ol(vl),...,o„(v„)) and dF(v) -
dF(vl) ... dF(v„). Player i's expected transfer when a is chosen is denoted by t;(a)
t~(a) - ~Pk(a)tt~(a) (2.4)
k
If player i's opponents play according to o while player i himself choosea action a;, then
his expected transfcr is
T,'(a;) - f t;(a(v)`a;) dF(v) (2.5)
while the probability that he receives the object is6
P; (a~) - f P~(o(v)`a~) dF(v) (2.6)
In this case, if players i's value is v;, then his expected utility is
U;(a~; vr) - vt~(a~) - T'(a;) (2.7)
The strategy combination o is a(Bayesian Nash) equélibrium of the mechanism p if for
al] i and all v;
a;(v;) E argmax U;(a;;v;) (2.8)
A mechanism is said to be a direct mechanism if A; -[0,1] for all i, i.e. players are asked
to report their values. A direct mechanismis said to be incentive compatibleif truthtelling
(i.e. ó;(v;) - v;) is an equilibrium. Note that if o is an equilibrium of the mechanism
p, then the direct mechanism {~ determined by p;(v) - p;(o(v)) and t';~(v) - t;~(o(v)) is
incentive compatible and leads to the same allocation. Hence, the restriction to incentive
compatible direct mechanisms is without loss of generality. (This is the so-called revela-
tion principle, see e.g. Myerson (1979).) For an incentive compatible direct mechanism
p, we simplify notation by writing P,(v;),T;(v;) and U;(v;) instead of Pa(v;),T,s(v;) and
U; (v;; v;), resp. where á denotes the atrategy of truthtelling (ó;(v;) - v; for all i).
We conclude this section by specifying three additional conditions that we want mech-
anisrns to satisfy. The requirements will be formulated only for direct mechanisms. An
indirect mechanism p is said to satisfy the requirements if it has an equilibrium a which
is such that the direct mechanism j~ - p o a satisfies them. First of all, since ex ante the
players are in symmetrical positions we want the mechanism to be symmetric, i.e. the7
mechanism should be anonymous: The probability that a player gets the object should
only depend on the vector of values and not on the player's name, and similarly for the
transfers. In particular, symmetry implies that the functions P;,T; and U; do not depend
on the player index i, hence, from now on, we will drop this index. Secondly, we want
the allocation to be ex post efficient, i.e. the object should end up with a player who
values it most, hence
if p;(v) 1 0, then v; - v~ (2.9)
A mechanism is ex post e~j' icient if it satisfies (2.9) for all v. Finally, we want all players
to be satisfied with the final allocation, i.e. the final allocation should be envy jree (Foley
(1967)): Ex post each player should (weakly) prefer what he himself receives above what
is allocated to some other player. This tequirement implies that any two players that do
not receive the object get the same monetary transfer
t;~(v) - t;~(v) --t;;(v)~(n - 1) for all i, j, l with j, l~ i.
It also implies that if player i gets the object, he prefers to make the transfer, i.e.
v; - t;;(v) 1 t;;(v)~(n - 1) for all i,v with p;(v) ~ 0,
and that each player j not getting the object indeed prefers not to get it
t;;(v)~(n - 1) ? v~ - t;;(v) for all j~ i, if p;(v) 1 0.
Iíence, we see that ex post efficiency is a necessary condition for ex post fairness. The
final allocation is envy free if and only if the object is allocated efficiently and the winner
pays each partner the same amount r(v) with
v'~n G r(v) G vh~n (2.10)8
where vh (resp. v') denotes the highest (resp. second higheat) value. A mechanism that
generates an envy free allocation for each possible value vector, will be called an ez post
Jairmechanism. The remainder of the paper is devoted to the question of whether such
mechanisms exist and what their properties are.
3 Examples of Mechanisms
In this section several division methods that have been proposed in the literature will
be illustrated. Attention will be confined to the case in which there are only two partic-
ipants and in which F is the uniform distribution on [0,1].
A first procedure is random allocation: each player receives the object with probability
1~2 and there are no side payments. Clearly, this mechanism is very inefficient, in fact,
the results of the next section imply that this mechanism yields the loweat expected
utility for each player, no matter what his value might be. One method for improving
the performance of this mechanism readily suggests itself, viz. let the random allocation
be followed by bargaining between the partners. Since a player cannot be forced to
trade if he doesn't want to, each player can only gain by engaging in the bargaining
and, therefore, the expected payoffs will be higher. The final allocation (and, hence, the
expected payoffs) will depend on how the rules for the bargaining game are specified.
For example, suppose that the rules are that simultaneously the buyer and the seller
submit bids and that the object is transferred, for a price equal to the average of the
bids, if and only if the buyer's bid exceeds that of the seller. Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1982) have shown that this game has an equilibriume given by
v,(v,) - 2~3 v, ~-1~4 oa(ve) - 2~3 vy t 1~12, (3.1)
hence, in the range where trade is possible, the seller overstatea his value while the buyer
6There exist other equilibria as well.9
understates his, and this has the consequence that the outcome is not always ex post
efficient. Straightforward computations show that the atrategies from (3.1) yield the
expected utility function U given by
1~4 v? t 1~8 v; ~ 9~64 if v; C 1~4
U(v;) - 1~2 v? i. 10~64 if 1~4 G v; C 3~4 (3.2)
1~2v'f3~8v;~}1~64 if v;~3~4
The reader might think that by using a different bargaining procedure, the perfor-
mance of this type of inechanism can be improved. However, it follows from the results
of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that, no matter what the rules are, there will al-
ways be combinations of valucs for which thc object ends up with the peraon who valuea
it leasL. R.andom allocation followed by bargaining performs badly because playera are
trcated asymmctri~~ally: Oncc thc init.ial prop~rty rights have been assigned, the part-
ners have conElicting interests. In order to get a better price, the seller pretends that the
object is worth more to him than it actually is while the buyer understates his value;
strategic behavior which implies that the players may fail to strike an efficient bargain.
These incentives for strategic manipulation can be reduced by forcing the players to
announce their bids before the object is allocated; if a player doesn't know whether he
will be the buyer or the sellet, then his bid will be closer to the actual value.' Formally,
one may proceed as follows. The players are asked to simultaneously submit bida bl and
6~, and then the object is randomly allocated. If the random move assigns the object to
player i, then player i may retain the object if b; ~ 6„ otherwise he aella it to player j for
the price p- (6; f b~)~2. Because of risk neutrality, this mechanism is equivalent to the
auction mechanism in which the players bid and the object is allocated to the highest
bidder who pays his partner a compensation of p-(b~ t bz)~4. This auction mechanism
will be analyzed at the end of this section (it corresponds to Lhe auction with 1- 1~2)
and we will see that the expected utilities generated by this mechanism dominate thoae
~Thie argument haa aleo been made in Samuelson (1985). That paper also diecuseed the a-auction
mechaniem with a - 1~2.Io
given by (3.2).
Another mechanism that may be used is the divide and choose method, specifically the
variant of this method that has been proposed in Luce and Raiffa (1957). Each person
adds 1(perfectly divisible) money unit to the pot, then a random move determinea who
will be the divider, this divider transfers a certain amount x from the pot to the object
and his partner has the choice between the object plus x or the remainder, 2- x, of the
money. If player d is the divider and he transfera x E [1~2, 1], then player c chooses the
object if v~ 1 2- 2x, so that player d's expected payoff is
(2 - x)(~x - I) t(vd ~ x)(~ - 2x).
IIence, player d's optimal choice is
xd - 7~8 - vd~4
and the divider's equilibrium payoffs are
Ud(vd) - (vd,2 f I,4)4
while those of the chooser are given by
1~4 if v~ C 1~4
U~(v~) - 1~4 -}. (v~ - 1~4)Z ií 1~4 C v~ C 3~4
v~ - 1~4 if v~ ? 3~4
It is interesting to note that U~(v;) ~ Ud(v;) for alI v;, hence, the method favors the
chooser. This is in sharp contrast to the case in which the values are perfectly known.
In the latter case, the method favors the divider, he can extract all the surplus. Also11
note that, under incomplete information, the object ends up with the chooser if and
only if v~ 1 1~4 f vd~2, hence, also this method may lead to an inefFicient allocation.
Again thc rcason is stratcgic manipulation: If vd is amall (resp. large), then the divider
is tempted to transfer relatively little (resp. relatively much) to the object, and if the
chooser's value is below (resp. above) average,then the chooser takea the alternative
that the divider doean't "expect" and an inefficient outcome results.
The cause of the inefFiciency associated with the divide and choose method is again
the fact that players are in asymmetric roles. It is better not to introduce roles and keep
th~~ nyium~~try. 'I'hi~m am varioux poaaibiliti~~s for mudifying thc method in Lhia way. We
now discusa two of these, both based on ideas of Banach and Knaster as reported in
Steinhaus (1948). The essential idea is to let the division be performed by a mediator.
For example, Lhe mediator continuously transfers money [rom Lhe pot to the object until
one of the players shouts `stop'. This player then receives the object plus the money
that has been transferred, his partner receives the remainder of the money. It is clear
that this mechanism is actually an auction mechanism. If we write s; - 1 f b;~2 for the
value of the pot at which player i shouts `stop', and interpret b; as player i's bid, then
the highest bidder gets the object and he pays his partner a price equal to half ofhis bid.
(Hence, this is the special case of the auction mechanism introduced below with a- 1.)
Alternatively, the mediator may first add all money to the object and then continu-
ously transfer money from the object to the pot. In this case the person who first shouta
`stop' receives the pot, his partner receives the object plus the remaindec of the money.
Again this mechanism is actually an auction mechanism. If player i shouts `stop' when
the amount that has been transferred to the pot is s; and we write s; - 1 f 6;~2 then
(with 6; being the bid of player i) the highest bidder gets the object and he pays this
partner a price equal to half of the bid that the partner made. (Hence, this is the special
case of the auction mechanism introduced next with a- 0.)
Generally, an auction mechanism may be deacribed as follows. Simultaneously the1`L
players bid and the object is allocated to the highest bidder for a price of ~ times the
highest bid, 6h, plus 1- a times the second highest bid, b,. The revenues of the auction
are shared equally by the partners so that, effectively, the wínner pays his partner a
compensation equal to (ab~ .} (1 - a)b,)~2. Above we encountered the Dutch auction
(~ - 1), the Vickrey auction (a - 0) and the case with .~ - 1~2 as special casea. It is
straightforward to verify that the atrategy combination v given by
Q;(v;) - 2~3v; ~- 1~3(1 - a) (3.5)
is a symmetric equilibrium of the auction mechanism. In Van Damme (1984) it was
shown that thia strategy pair is actually the unique symmetric equilibrium. Note that
the equilibrium strategy is monotonic, hence, the person with the highest value bids
highest so that the object always ends up with the person who values it most. Hence, any
auction mechanism is ex post effícients. The reader can easily verify that the expected
payoffs associated with the auction mechanism are given by
U(v;) - v?~2 f 1~6. (3.6)
Hence, the expected payoffs are independent of a, a fact that is explained by the resulta of
Sect. 4. The reader also notes that in terms of expected utilities the auction mechanisms
indeed dominate random allocation followed by bargaining (the RHS from (3.6) is alwaya
strictly larger than that of (3.2)) as well as the divide and choose method (if U is as in
(3.6), then U(v;) 1 Ud(v;)~2~-U~(v;)~2 with equalityonly for v; E{1~6,5~6}). Although
the different auction methods are equivalent at the interim stage (i.e. when a player only
knows his own value), they ate not equivalent ex post: the transfer payments depend
on 1. If v~ ~ vzi t.hen pla.ycr 1 pays player 2 t.he amount w~~3 .} (1 - a)(v~~3 i~ 1~2).
Oue notes that Lhis transfer cannot alwaye lie between v~~2 and v~~2 so that no auction
dln Van Damme (1984) it wae ehown that theee propertiee hold for any number o[ playere, n, and
for any dietribution F.13
mcchanísm is ex post fair.
The following two conclusions emerge from these examples. Mechanisms that have
players play different roles typica.lly lead to inefficient outcomes. Symmetric mechaniams
have better efficiency properties, but also these mechanisms may yield outcomes that are
not ex post fair. In the Sections 6 and 7 we will describe mechanisms that are ex post
fair. In Sect. 4 we explain why all auction mechanisms are equivalent at the interim
stage.
4 Revenue Equivalence
In this section we derive a`revenue equivalence theorem' that explains why all auction
mechanisms are equivalent at the interim stage. From now on attention will be restricted
to direct mechanisms. By the revelation principle, this is without loss of generality.
We start by giving a characterization of incentive compatibility. Recall that a direct
mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. if
for all i and all v;, w; E[0,1]
v;P(v;) - T(v;) 1 v;P(w;) - T(w;) (4.1)
where P and T are defined by (2.5) and (2.6) and by the temarks concerning notation
that were made after (2.8). The proof of Lemma 1 is standard and follows ideas outlined
in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). (See also Cramton et al. (1987).) To make the
paper self-contained, however, the proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 1 . A direct mechanism te is incentive compatióle if and only if P is nonde-
creasing and T is related to P according to
T(2'r) - T(fi) f fu xdP(x) (v~ E[0,1]) (4.2)
014
5ince transfers sum to zero for each realized vector of values (Eq. (2.3)) and since
players are treated symmetrically, we have that
f T(v;)dF(v;) - 0. (4.3)
Together with (4.2) this boundary condition implies that, for incentive compatible mech-
anisms, T and therefore U is completely determined by P. In particular it follows that all
ex post ef6cient mechanisms are equivalent at the interim stage. (All such mechanisms
have P(v;) - F(v;)"-r.) Straightforward calculations show that
T(0) - f1(1 - F(x) - xÍ(x))P(x)dx,
0
hencethat
U(v;) - I~(F(x) ~ xf(x) - 1)P(x)dx t~v~ P(x)dx (4.4)
For ex post efHcient mechanisms, this expression can be rewritten as
U(v;) - n-} n n 1 f~ F"(x)dx - f r F"-1(x)dx f f v F"-r(x)dx (4.5)
Let us remark that the constant term U(0) in Eq. (4.5) is equal to (l~n)th of the ex-
pected revenue generated when the objectis auctioned,say by the Vickrey procedure
(or indeed by any auction procedure that always allocates the object to the person who
values it most). We return to this property in Section 7. The following proposition
summarizes the results obtained thus far
Proposition 1 . The expected utility Junction U associatedwith an incentive compatible
mechanism depends only on ihe probabilityjunction P and is given by (~.4). Forex post15
e,~cient mechanisms, P(x) - F(x)"'t and then !he expected utility Junction is given 6y
(4.5).
Note that Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 imply that the expected utility function U ia
nondecreasing and convex. Another interesting property ia that U(v;) 1 v;~n for each
mechanism and each value v;, hence, each mechanism yielda at least as much utility as
random allocation dces. Note that Proposition 2 implies that the individual rationality
constraints are not binding, each player is, no matter what his value might be, willing
to participate in any mechanism.
Proposition 2. Every mechanism is (weaklyJ preJerred to random allocation, i.e.
U(v;) 1 v;~n for any incentive compatióle mechanism.
Proof. See the appendix.
From now on attention will be restricted to ex post efficient mechanisms. The follow-
ing Proposition, which states that ex ante efFiciency is equivalent to ex post efficiency,
provides an additional justification for this restriction. Namely the proposition implies
that there dces not exist a mechanism that is uniformly preferred above an ex post effi-
cient mechanism. A mechanism is said to be ex ante efHcient if it maximizes the ex ante
expected payoffs over the set of all incentive compatible mechanisms, i.e. if M is the set
of all incentive compatible mechanisms satisfying (2.1) -(2.3), then v E M is ex ante
e,~eienl if
f U„(v;)dF(v;) c I U„(v;)dF(v;)
(or all t~ E M, where C~N(v;) is player i's expected payoffaesociated with p if his value ie v;.
Proposition 3. The mechanism p is ex ante e,~cient if and only if it yields an ex post
e)~cient outcome for almost all value comóinations, i.e. if (2.9~ is satisfied for almost
a!I v.I6
Proof. Let v be any ex post efficient mechanisms. Then for any mechanism p we have
in view of (4.3)
f U„(v;)dF(v;) - f v;P(v;)dF(v;)
Furthermore, with v" being the highest component of v, we have
n f v;P(v;)dF(v;) - n f v;p;(v)dF(v)




v"dF(v) - n f U„(v;)dF(v;)
Since the inequality in the above chain is strict unless (2.9) is satisfied for almost all v,
the proof is complete. ~
5 An Impossibility Theorem
In this section we turn to some resolutions of the fair division problem that have been
proposed in the literature for the case in which the value vector is commonly known,
and we will show that the allocations corresponding to these procedures cannot be im-
plemented when there is incomplete information about the players' values.
A fair division method is a mapping m that assigns to each value vector v a utility
u;"(v) for each player i. For an incentive compatible direct mechanism ~t let us write
9Such a mechanism indeed exiate: In Van Damme (1989) it wae ehown that the a-suction methode
diecuseed in Section 3 have thie property. Cramton et al. (1987) have ehown that, more generally, ex
poet efTicirnt ~nechaniemx exixt if and only if the initial dietribution of ownenhip share~ i~ not ~too
aeymmetric" .17
u"(v) for the utility that player i gets from p when the value vector is v(assuming, of
course, that the truthtelling equilibrium is played in p). Hence u"(v) - v;p;(v) - t;(v).
We say that the [air division method m can be implementad if there exiets an incen-
tive compatible mechanism {r with u;(v) - u;"(v) for all i and v. We will show that
neither the Steinhaus division method (Steinhaus (1948)), nor the egalitarian division
can be implemented in case there is incomplete information. Since both methods can
be obtained by applying the Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950)) resulting from an
appropriately chosen threat point, we turn to the Nash bargaining solution first.
Assume that the vector of values v is common knowledge. Since side payments are
possible, the Pareto effiicient frontier in utility space is given by
{u E R"; ~u; - v~`}
If d is the utility vector in case o[ disagreement and ~; d; G vh, then the Nash bargaining
solutiou uf the problen~ ia t.he utility vector u' determincd by
~ u; - v~ and u; - d; - u~ - dl all i
hence
u; - dt f (vh - ~di)~n (5.1)
'I'wo choices of d appear natural. If in case of conflict the object is destroyed then d; - 0
for all i and u; - v~~n. This allocation corresponds to the egalitarian solution, the side
payments are arranged in such a way that all playera have equal payoffs. A second pos-
sibility is to resort to random allocation in case of conflict. Then d; - v;~n for all t and]R
the resulting allocation is the one proposed in Steinhaus (1948). Steinhaus calls v;~n the
`fair share' of player i and he proposes to divide equally the surplus that remains after
each player has received his fair share. Note that the Steinhaus allocation is not envy free.
'1'he main result of this section is
Proposition 4 . Neither the egalitarian nllocation nor the Steinhaus allocation can be
implemented when there is asymmetric inJormation about the value vector v.
Proof. For a E[0,1] write
u;(v) - av;~n t wh - a~ v~~n) ~n (5.2)
Then a- 0 corresponds to the egalitarian solution while a- 1 yields the Steinhaus
allocation. We have to show that there does not exist an incentive compatible mechanism
p with u;'(v) - v;p;(v) - t;(v) - u;(v) for all v. Assume auch a mechanism p does exist.
Then p is ex post efficient so that, from Proposition 1, we get U'(v;) - P(v;) - F(v;)"-1
On the other hand, Eq. (5.2) yields
nU(v;) - n f u;(v-;,v;)dF-;(v-;)
so that
n-




nU'(v;) - 1 -}- F'(v;)"-~
n
Combining this expression with U'(v;) - F(v;)"'1 yields19
F~-1(v~) - ~~n,
hence, F is constant. But this contradicts the assumption that we have a situation with
incomplctc information. ~
It is interesting to investigate which consequences strategic behavior has on the final
outcome if the Steinhaus procedure or the egalitarian procedure is used to determine
the allocation. Identifying a stated value with a bid, we see that the rules of the latter
procedure correspond to those of an auction in which the object is allocated to the
higliest bidder who pays each of his partners l~nth of his bid. In general this method
yields an ex post efficient outcome, but as we know from Section 3 the outcome need
not be ex post fair. (The egalitarian method corresponds to the a-auction from Section
3 with a- 1.) The Steinhaus procedure correaponds to an auction in which the highest
bidder (say this is player i) receives the object and in which this person pays each player
j an amount equal to b~~n t (b; -~~ b~~n)~n. Lyon (1986) has shown that this auction
mechanism has a symmetric, increasing equilibrium. Hence, this mechanism is also ex
post efficient and the interim expected payoffs are given by (4.5). In the case of 2 players
these niles correspond to those of the auction mechanism from Section 3 with a- 1~2,
hence, the final outcome need not be fair.
6 A Possibility Theorem
In this section we show that it is possible to ensure that the final allocation will be envy
free by giving an example of a mechanism leading to fair allocations.
Proposition 5. There exists an incentive compatib(e, ex post jair mechanism.
Proof: For a value vector v E R„ let v~ be the highest component of v and let v' be the20
second highest component of v. Consider the following direct mechanism: The object is
allocated to the person with the highest value, he paye the amount
t(v", v') - 1 { v" - f v~ F(x)dx1
(6.1)
n l o~ 11
to each of his partners. In case there are multiple, say k, playera with the highest value
then each of them receives the object with probability l~k and the person getting the
object pays each of his partners vti~n.
Clearly, thia mechanism treats the players symmetrically. Furthermore, the amount
that the winner pays to cach of his partners lica inbetween v'~n and vti~n eo that the
mechanism is ex post fair. It remains to verify that the mechanism is incentive com-
patible, i.e. that truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium. Since the mechanism is ex post
efficient, it suffices, by Lemma 1, to show that the expected transfer payments satisfy
T'(v;) - v;P'(v;) - (n - 1)v;f(v;)F(v;)"-2. The verification of this identity involves
straightforward calculations which are carried out in the appendix. O
Note that, since the mechanism from Proposition 5 is a direct mechaniam, it is context
dependent, i.e. the rules of the mechanism directly depend on the characteristic~ of the
underlying uncertainty, i.e. the mechanism depends on the distribution function F.
The author has not succeeded in finding a context independent mechanism of whicó the
equilibrium gives rise to the direct mechanism from Proposition 5. It should also be
notc~d that the mechanism described in (6.1) is probably not the unique ex post fair
mechanism, however, in a certain sense it is the simplest one possible. Namely, it is the
unique ex post fair mechanism for which the transfers depend only on v~ and v' and for
which
8t(vh, v') is independent of v', and
avh
8t(vh,v')
is independent of vh. av'21
7 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Up to now we have focused on Bayesian Nash equilibria of inechanisms. It is easily scen
Lhat, without relaxing some of our requirementa, no positive resulta can be obtained for
the stronger notion of dominant strategy equilibria. Truthtelling ia a dominant strategy
for each player in the direct mechanism p if
v;p;(v) - t;(v) ~ v;p;(v`w;) - t;(v`w;) for all i, v, w; (7.1)
with the inequality being strict for at Ieast one value vector v. For ex poat efficient
mechanisms, condition (7.1) implies that the winner's transfer payment should be inde-
pendent of his value, and that also each looser's transfer must be independent of this
player's value. In ex post fair mechanisms all loosers receive the same payoff, which by
(7.1) can, therefore, only depend on the winner's value. Hence, if the transfers have
to balance for each combination of values (condition (2.3)), then the transfers must be
constant, but surely a mechanisrn in which Lhe transfers do not depend on the value
vector cannot be ex post fair. Hcnce,
Proposition 8. There does not exist an ez post jair mechanism jor which truthtelling
is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
Ifone insists on equilibria in dominant strategies, then positive results can be obtained
by relaxing condition (2.3): One may be satisfied if the transfers balance on average, i.e.
ií condition (4.3) is satisfied instead of condition (2.3). Condition (4.3) may be eatab-
lished by allowing the mediator to act as a clearing house who balances the payments.
(If inediators are risk neutral and if the market for mediators is competitive, the players
will indeed be able to find a mediator who is willing to play this role.) By reviewing
the proof of Proposition 1, one sees that condition (2.3) is not essential for this result
to hold, the proof just uses (4.3). Hence, if the mediator has zero expected profits, then
(in an incentive compatible mechanism) the player's expected utilities are still given by22
(4.4). To have an ex post fair mechanism with an equilibrium in dominant strategiea, the
winner should pay an amount w(v) that doea not depend on hia own value, while each
looser should get an amount 1(v) that only depends on the winner's value. Furthermore,
it should be the case that vh - w(v) 1 I(v) ? v' - w(v). One possibility immediately
suggests itself: The mediator first buys the object for a price B of which each player
reccivca l~~n; aftcr the mcdiator haa acquired it, he aella ía again to one of the partners
by using the Vickrey ( 1962) procedure, i.e. the object is allocated to the higheat bidder
who pays the second highest bid. Hence, using the above notation, w(v) --B~n -~ v'
and 1(v) - B~n. Clearly, truthtelling is a dominant strategy and the resulting allocation
is always fair. Furthermore, in light of the remarks made above, the mediator's expected
payoffs are zero if his bid B is equal to nU(0) where U(0) is given by (4.5).
An alt,errrative possibility is that the mediator uses the information revealed by the
auction to determine the compensation of the loosers rather than to determine the price
that the winner should pay. Specifically, the mediator may use the following procedure.
First he asks each player to contribute an amount C equal to (n - 1)~n timea the ex-
pectation of the highest value (i.e. C-(n - 1) J vhdF(v)~n). After these contributions
have been made he auctions the object. This time, however, the winner does not have
to pay anything, rather it is tlre case that each looser receives an amount equal to the
wiuncr's valuc. Ilcncc, in Lcrms of thc, abovc notation, w(v) - C and I(v) - vti - C.
Again truthtelling is a dominant strategy and, no matter what the values are, all playera
have the same net payoffs. Hence we have shown
Proposition 7. With an active mediator, who is used to balance the budgets on av-
erage, there exists an ex post jair mechanism Jor which truthtelling is an equilibrium in
dominant strategies. In Jact there exists such a mechanism that leads to the egalitarian
outcome, i.e. all players have the same net payoff.
Clearly, the mechanisms discussed in this section are viable only if the mediator is able
to make an accurate assessment of the value of the object, i.e. if he knows the diatribution23
F. It will also be clear that even if he knows F, he will be reluctant to use the second
procedure discussed above. Namely, although truthteling is a dominant atrategy in the
game, the mediator should fear that the agents will try to increase their payoffs by more
sophisticated ways of manipulating the outcome. For example, the players could make
a secret contract that each player will bid his value plus an amount x and that each
looser will pay the winner x~n. With this contract in place it is a dominant strategy for
each player i to bid v; -} x in the mediator's auction game. Compared with the original
situation in which there is no contract each player increases his payoff by (n - 1)x~n, at
the expense of the mediator who makea an expected loss of (n - 1)x. Hence, it is very
unlikely that we will observe such a mechanism in practice.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated a simple fair division situation with incomplete in-
formation. The analysis was simplified by the assumptions of symmetry (all values are
drawn from the same distribution) and independence (all valuea are drawn indepen-
dently). Further research should be devoted to relaxing these assumption. The assump-
tion of independence seems especially inappropriate in the case of the dissolving of joint
ventures, one of the examples that was mentioned in the Introduction. In that case the
value of each partner depends on the future prospects for the businesa about which the
partners may have different information.
The paper was motivated by the idea that it is desirable to guarantee an ex post fair
outcome. It may be questioned whether ex post fairness is indeed desirable, especially
since some types of a player may, at the interim stage, prefer non-fair mechaniams above
fair onesto. In Van Damme (1985) it was shown that, for the example discuased in
~aWhy thie ie ao cao easily be seen in an asymmetric example. Suppoee that player 1 values the object
at vl - 0 and that player 2 valuea the object either at v~ - 0(with probability p) or at v~ - 100 (with
probability 1- p). In an ex poat fair incentive compatible mechanism, player 2 always gete the object
and he pays at moat 5 for it. If p ie sufficiently small player 1 clearly prefers a mechaniem in which the
object is allocated only to player 2 íf thie player ie willing to pay a eufficiently high price for it.24
Section 3, the expected utility for a player with value 1~2 is maximi2ed by a mechaniam
that assigne the object to the person with the highest value when thia value ie not in the
interval [1~4,3~4] and that allocates the object randomly if the highest value is in this
interval. In that paper it was also shown that only a type with value v; - 0 or v; - 1
prefers an ex post fair mechanism above any other mechanism. If one doea not ineist
on ex post efficiency, then the allocation mechaniam ehould reflect a fair compromise
between the alternative types of a player~r and the aolutions of Harsanyi and Selten
(1972) and Myerson (1984) specify axioms for determining auch fair compromises. If,
however, one insists on ex post efficiency, then Propoaition 1 shows that the interim
utilities are completely determined so that according to Harsanyi~Selten and Myerson
all mechanisms are equivalent. At the ex post stage, however, such mechanisms are not
necessarily equívalent: some of these guarantee ex post fair mechanisms while others do
not.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If u is incentive compatible, then (4.1) holds and by rearranging
and intcrchanging Lhe roles of v; and w; we obtain
w;(P(v~) - P(wt)) ~ T(v;) -T(w;) ~ v;(P(v~) - P(wr)),
so that P must be nondecreasing. Furthermore, T is differentiable whenever P is, and
at such points of differentiability T'(v;) - v;P'(v;). At other points, a jump in v;P(v;) is
matched by a jump in T(v;) and such discontinuities are accounted for by in the integral
in (4.2), which is understood to be a Lebesgue-Stieltjes integtal. Hence, (4.2) is indeed
correct.
Conversely, if (4.2) holds, then for any v;, w; E(0,1]
T(v;) - T(w,) - fv~ xdP(x) G rv~ v;dP(x) - v;(P(v;) - P(wr)),
w Jw
which, after rearranging, yields the incentive compatibility condition (4.1). o
Proof of PropoaiLion Z. I~P(riUBC b~ NYn1~fIPLry, Lhc cx alltc probability that a playcr
receives the object is l~n, hence JP(x)dF(x) - l~n. In view of (4.4) we therefore have
to show that
v; ~t f(x)P(x)dx G f 1(F(x) f xf(x) - 1)P(x)dx t fv~ P(x)dx,
or, equivalently
~v v;j(x)P(x)dx f f ~(v;f(x) f 1)P(x)dx ~ f1(F(x) f xj(x))P(x)dx
Now by using partial integration it is easily seen that
fV~(v; - x)j(x)P(x)dx C I~~ F(x)P(x)dx,28
so that it sufticea to show that
f,(v;j(x) t 1)P(x)dx c f,(F(s) t xj(x))P(x)dx,
v v
or equivalently
Il(1 - F(x))P(x)dx G f r(x - v;)j(x)P(x)dx.
v - v
Integrating the integral of the RHS by parts we see that we have to show that
f I(1 - F(x))P(x)dx G (1 - v;)P(1) - 11 F(x)P(x)dx - I, (x - v;)F(x)dP(x)
v - v v
which is equivalent to
f r P(x)dx c(1 - v;)P(1) - Il(x - v;)F(x)dP(x)
By integrating the integral ofthe LHS by parts it is seen that this inequality is equivalent
to
v;(P(1) - P(v;)) - f, xdP(x) ~- f'( z - v;)F(x)dP(x),
v v
which in turn is equivalent to
f1(x - v~)(1 - F(x))dP(x) ~ 0,
v
an inequality which is clearly satisfied. ~
Proof of Proposition 5: It remains to be shown that the mechanism determined
by (6.1) is incentive compatible, i.e. that T'(v;) - v;P'(v;) - (n - 1)v;f(v;)F(v;)"-~.29
Write x- v"; (resp. y - v';) for the highest (resp. second higheat) component of v-;.
Then the joint distribution ~ of x and y is given by
J F"-1(x) f (n - 1)F"-~(y)(F(x) - F(y)) if x) y
~(x' y) - SI
if x G y, F"-' (y)
and the associated joint density is equal to
((n - 1)(n - 2)Í(x)Í(y)F(y)"-3 if x~ y
Sl 0 if xGy
With t given by (5.1), the transfer that player i makes if he has the value v; is equal to
(n - 1) t(v;,x) if x G v;
t;(v;) - -t(x,v;) ií y G v; C x
-t(x,y) if v; 1 y,
and the expected transfer is
T(v:) - 1 f t;(v~)d~(x,y)-
Differentiating with respect to v; we find that
T~(vr) -(n - 1) fv' fV' ~~ t(v;,x)d~(x,y) t(n f 1)Z t(v;,v;)Ï(v~)F(v~)"-~
- 11 fV~ a t(x,v;)d~(x,y)-Ilt(x,v;)d~(x,v.)
v, 0 Ó71; v,
f(n- 1) t(v;,v;)f(v;)F(v;)"-~ ~ f~ t(x,v;)d~(x,v;).
Rearranging and collecting terms we see that
T~(v;) -(n - 1)v; f(v~)F(v;)"-~ t(n n 1)(1 - F(Vt))F(vt)"-~
i n-
v F(v;)d~(x, y)
- n v, o
- (n - 1)v; Í(v:)F(v~)"-~,a0
and this is what had to be proved. ~Discussior. Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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